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ABSTRACT: This thesis studies Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.748 [2017], which is commonly known as the first legalisation of
same-sex marriage in Asia. The Taiwanese legalisation of same-sex
marriage was not decided by the congress (Legislative Yuan) by a
majority vote; on a contrary, it was decided by the constitutional
court (Judicial Yuan) in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017].
In its court order recognising same-sex “unions,” the Judicial Yuan
established a period of no more than two years during which the
Legislative Yuan must settle the precise form of legalisation that such
recognition of same-sex “unions” will take. Hence, the Legislative
Yuan must decide the form of legalisation, either same-sex
“marriage” or same-sex “civil partnership,” in no more than two
years, and will accordingly face public acceptance or criticism of its
decision. In other words, the Judicial Yuan legalised same-sex
“unions” in light of its ideological attitudes but strategically avoided
being criticised by the mass public.

1. INTRODUCTION
The first legalisation of same-sex marriage in Asia was
decided by the supreme judicial body of Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan,
through Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]. The case was
first appealed by Chi Chia-Wei on 20 August 20151 and subsequently
appealed by the Taipei City Government on 4 November 2015.2 The
two appeals were consolidated by the Judicial Yuan, and the
conditional leave was granted on 10 February 2017.3 The case was
heard on 24 March of the same year,4 and the judicial decision
1

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
2 Id.
3 Judicial Yuan Proclamation (司法院新聞稿) No.106-015 (Feb. 10, 2017).
4 Id.
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rendering the illegalisation of same-sex “unions” as unconstitutional
was held and promulgated on 24 May.5
Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan is known for its judicial
assertiveness,6 and its precedents imply that it is de facto7 and de jure8
the sole constitutional organ that enjoys the power of the last word in
politics – e.g., the Justices dismissed Taiwan’s authoritarian congress
for peaceful democratisation in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261
[1990] and struck down as unconstitutional the Additional Articles of
the Constitution of R.O.C. (1999) in Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.499 [2000]. Hence, it is not a surprise in Taiwan when the Judicial
Yuan orders the Legislative Yuan to legislate whatever the Court has
decided, and we can also discover this pattern in Taiwan’s same-sex
marriage case.9 The Justices held:
This Court thus orders that the authorities concerned shall
amend or enact the laws as appropriate in accordance with the ruling
of this Interpretation, within two years after the announcement of this
Interpretation. It is within the discretion of the authorities concerned
to determine the formality (for example, amendment of the Marriage
Chapter, enactment of a special Chapter in Part IV on Family of the
Civil Code, enactment of a special law, or other formality) for
achieving the equal protection of the freedom of marriage for two
persons of the same sex to create a permanent union of intimate and
exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life.10
However, public opinion polls in Taiwan between 2012 and
2017 show that the Justices’ decision does not enjoy wide public
support,11 because public opinion in relation to the legalisation of
same-sex marriage is sharply divided. The Judicial Yuan’s
precedents suggest that the Court is supposed to apply the political
5

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]

(2017).
6 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEWS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
IN ASIAN CASES 106-157 (Cambridge University Press 2003).
7 E.g., SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第261 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
261] (1990); SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.

499 (2000).
8 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan) with MINGUO XIANFA art. 171
(1947) (Taiwan).
9 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
10 Id.
11 See generally VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 12-15 (Cambridge University Press 2003).
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question doctrine,12 but the Justices here chose to make a concrete
decision;13 this thesis considers this aspect as a sincere and attitudinal
decision on the part of the Justices.14 Nevertheless, the Justices made
a strategic decision15 that leaves “the formality for achieving the
equal protection of the freedom of marriage”16 to “the authorities
concerned,”17 i.e., the Legislative Yuan. In other words, the Justices
decided only on the legalisation of same-sex unions,18 but
strategically left the political hot potato to the Legislative Yuan,
which is obliged to make a decision between the legalisation of samesex marriage and that of same-sex civil partnerships.

2. THEORETICAL INSIGHTS
According to Alan Carter, morality implies freedom because
there is no moral problem if a person has no free will to make
decisions.19 Hence, the German criminal law accordingly regards any
conduct without freedom as a human tool20 (Menschliches
Werkzeug), i.e., indirect perpetration (Mittelbare Täterschaft).21
However, it is obvious that in the modern era freedom is sometimes
considered a threat to morality, and the dilemma between freedom
and morality described by Carter is this:
If freedom lacks value, then the problem of morality seems to
require no answer. On the other hand, if one’s personal freedom does
have value, and if we are to take moral prescriptions seriously, then
12 E.g., SHIZI NO. 328 JIESHI (釋字第328 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
328] (1993); see SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
748] (2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting); SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解
釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
13 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
14 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (Cambridge University Press 2002) (asserting that “the
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the justices”).
15 See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 1-21 (CQ
Press 1998).
16 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Alan Carter, Morality and Freedom, 53 PHILOS. Q. 161, 161 (2003).
20 IRYNA MARCHUK, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 205 (2014).
21 Id.
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it appears that we need to provide some answer to the question of
what could justify discounting that value. And were we able to do so,
we would have provided an answer to the problem of morality. This
implies that if we want to justify moral principles, then we need only
consider the worst case, namely, when it is accepted that the freedom
to choose is valuable.22
The “worst case”23 this thesis has proposed to justify moral
principles in relation to the legalisation of same-sex marriage is to
question whether morality constitutes the cause of legal
discrimination, i.e., is it just to discriminate against lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals legally under moral
hazard concerns? In other words, is society, through its legislative
institutions, entitled to constitutionally legislate a discriminatory law
in accordance with morality?24 As far as this thesis is concerned,
morals form the source of law, as illustrated by Hans Kelsen,25 but
not the source of lawful discrimination.
There is no doubt that the concept of “marriage” in
accordance with morals is a derivative of heterosexuality, as the
concept is often associated with a societal need to establish stable and
legal unions for the purpose of procreation and child rearing.
However, Chris Beasley, Heather Brook, and Mary Holmes indicate
that heterosexual marriage seems to be only a natural preference,
because procreation is never deemed a requisite of marriage.26
Hence, the moral sense of marriage, which narrows the definition to
heterosexual marriage, reflects the sexual preference of the majority
of people and raises a legal and constitutional question: the
derivatives for the majority on the basis of heterosexuality are legally
and safely protected as an “institution,”27 but the absence of an equal
institution ensuring derivatives for the minority, which is based upon

22

Carter, supra note 19, at 163.
Id.
24 But see R V. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC
115 (Lord Hoffmann, holding that “Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to
fundamental principles of human rights”).
25 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 62-63 (Max Knight trans., University of
California Press 1967).
26 CHRIS BEASLEY ET AL., HETEROSEXUALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 28-29 (2012).
27 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
23

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss1/4

2019]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

67

homosexuality, has traditionally been deemed legally acceptable.28
On what grounds can such a great de jure inequity be rationalised?
Moreover, in modern societies and at least in terms of most
developed countries, both heterosexuality and homosexuality are
lawful, in both essence and behaviour, so the legal dilemma
continues: how can the law provide no protection for lawful
behaviour? When a heterosexual couple becomes engaged, the law
provides them with the institution of marriage.29 However, when a
homosexual couple becomes engaged, the law provides them nothing
de jure and forces them to maintain their relationship de facto. Both
sexual preferences and behaviours are lawful, but why does the law
treat them unequally?
As far as this thesis is concerned, the legalisation of same-sex
marriage is not so much a claim to the freedom of marriage as a claim
to equality,30 i.e., that LGBT individuals should be regarded as equal
to the majority of the people de jure, irrespective of sexual
preference.31 Unless the law stipulates against homosexuality, in the
same manner that the law prohibits incest, marriage should not be
restricted to heterosexual couples. In other words, whether LGBT
people are entitled to freely marry is not the core of the matter; the
heart of the issue, according to this thesis, is by what ground the
freedom to marry should be limited to heterosexuality.

3. STATISTICAL INSIGHTS
As a matter of fact, Taiwanese public opinion in relation to
the legalisation of same-sex marriage is sharply divided, and it can be
read differently: either support for or opposition to the legalisation of
same-sex marriage constitutes at least one-third of the population in
Taiwan, and it also depends on how such legalisation is defined. For
example, a public opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Justice32
showed that support for legal protection of same-sex marriage

28

Id.
THE LAW & SOCIETY READER II 339 (Erik Larson & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2014).
30 Mock Constitutional Trial No.2 (Nigel N.T. Li, concurring), 253 TAIWAN L. J. 91,
106-107 (2014).
31 Id.
32 ROC Ministry of Justice, Baozhang Tongxing Banlu Quanyi Fangshi Zhi Minyi
Diaocha (保障同性伴侶權益方式之民意調查) [Public Opinion Poll in Relation to the
Form of Legal Protection of Sam-sex Unions] 3 (Dec. 29, 2015).
29
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comprised 56.3 per cent33 of the total population in December 2015;
however, only 35.3 per cent of the population supported the
legalisation of same-sex “marriage,” along with 21 per cent of the
population that only supported the legalisation of same-sex “civil
partnership.”34 Nevertheless, most of the public opinion polls listed
in Table 1 have not differentiated the legalisation of same-sex
marriage from civil partnership. Hence, these surveys in effect were
precisely polls in relation to the legalisation of same-sex “unions,”
rather than polls on the legalisation of same-sex “marriage.”

33
34

Id.
Id.
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Table 1: Public Opinion Polls on Legalisation of Same-Sex
Marriage, 2012–2017
Public Opinion Poll

Support Oppose

N/A

TVBS Poll Center (Apr. 2012)35

49%

29%

21%

China Times Poll Center (Aug. 2012)36

56.2%

31.3%

12.5%

United Daily News Poll Center (Dec.
2012)37

55%

37%

8%

Academia Sinica (Apr. 2013)38

52.5%

30.1%

17.4%

TAPCPR (Jul. 2013)39

52.75% 37.06% 10.19%

Taiwan Foundation of Democracy (Dec.
2014)40

54%

44.6%

1.4%

Ministry of Justice (Dec. 2015)

56.3%

31.7%

11.6%

Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (Nov.
2016)41

46.3%

45.4%

8.3%

Nationalist Party (Nov. 2016)42

51.7%

43.3%

5%

Apple Daily (May 2017)43

34.34% 55.85%

9.81%

(Source: Compiled by the author)

Most of the public opinion polls in relation to the legalisation
of same-sex marriage mislead us into concluding that Taiwan is ready
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for anti-discrimination laws in regard to LGBT people; however, this
is not at all the case. According to the 2015 Ministry of Justice poll,44
the ratio of the supporters of same-sex marriage and civil partnership
to total population was 56.3 per cent, which is approximately equal
to results from other polls before 2016. However, the ratio dropped
dramatically to 34.34 per cent45 only one day after the promulgation
35

Guoren Dui Tongxinglian Kanfa Mindiao (國人對同性戀看法民調) [Public
Opinion Poll in Relation to the Public Attitude towards Homosexuality], TVBS POLL
CENTER (April 2012), http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/PCH/201204/5lge5lexqf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Q8C-KBVF].
36 Guoren Dui Tongxing Hunyin Hefa Hua De Kanfa Diaocha (國人對同性婚姻合法
化的看法調查) [Public Opinion Poll in Relation to the Public Attitude towards Same-sex
Marriage], CHINA TIMES POLL CENTER (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://mypaper.pchome.com.tw/miss33lin/post/1323171374
[https://perma.cc/U642-BSPZ].
37 Mindiao: Tongxing Hunyin: Yes; Zinu Tongzhi: No (民調: 同性婚姻: Yes，子女同
志: No), UNITED DAILY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://vision.udn.com/vision/story/7645/737364
[perma.cc/7GQ2-BFFJ] [hereinafter Public Opinion Poll: Same-sex Marriage: Acceptable;
Children as LGBT Individuals: Unacceptable].
38 Chang Ying-Hwa et al., Taiwan Social Change Survey 2012, Phase 6, Wave 3,
ACADEMIA SINICA 308 (2013).
39 Guanjian De Shi Nian, Guanjian De 1/4: Tongxing Hunyin Fangdiao Jieguo
Shuoming (關鍵的十年，關鍵的1/4: 同性婚姻訪調結果說明) [The Crucial Decade and
the Key Quarter Vote: An Interpretation of the Public Opinion Poll in Relation to Same-sex
Marriage], UNITED DAILY NEWS POLL CENTER 5 (2013) [https://perma.cc/CJ7J-ARDK].
40 “Tongzhi Hunyin Hefa Hua” Zuixin Diaocha: 2X Sui Minzhong Gaoda 84% Zhichi
(「同志婚姻合法化」最新調查: 2X歲民眾高達84%支持) [The Latest Public Opinion
Poll in Relation to the “Legalisation of Same-sex Marriage”: Supported by 84% of the
Citizens in the Age Group of 20 to 29], SETN (Dec. 8, 2014),
www.setn.com/News.aspx?PageGroupID=1&NewsID=51829&PageType=1
[perma.cc/C5MG-8Q73].
41 Yen Chen-Kai, Hunyin Pingquan Zuixin Mindiao: Ting Tong Fan Tong Shi Jun Li
Di, 40 Sui Yi Xia Ting Tong Ju Duo (婚姻平權最新民調：挺同反同勢均力敵，40歲以下
挺同居多) [The Latest Public Opinion Poll in Relation to the Equality of Marriage: Support
and Opposition Are Roughly the Same, Citizens under 40 Prefer the Equality of Marriage],
STORM MEDIA (Nov. 28, 2016), www.storm.mg/article/194927 [perma.cc/UJD4-DRLT].
42 John Wang, Guo Min Dang Gongbu Mindiao: 53% Zancheng Tongxing Hunyin Li
Zhuanfa (國民黨公佈民調：53%贊成同性婚姻立專法) [The Nationalist Party’s Public
Opinion Poll: 53% of Citizens Prefer a Special Law for Same-sex Marriage], UNITED
EVENING NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ettoday.net/news/20161128/819415.htm
[https://perma.cc/4AZ9-BS7K].
43 Tonghun Shi Xian Yuyin Mindiao (同婚釋憲語音民調), APPLE DAILY (May 25,
2017), https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/daily/20170525/37662089
[perma.cc/DT4W-A2RJ] [hereinafter Public Opinion Poll through Phone Calls in Relation
to the Judicial Yuan’s Decision over Same-sex Marriage].
44 ROC Ministry of Justice, supra note 32.
45 Public Opinion Poll through Phone Calls in Relation to the Judicial Yuan’s Decision
over Same-sex Marriage, supra note 43.
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of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]. The public opinion
poll conducted by Apple Daily on 25 May 2017 reminds us that there
is a gap between the legalisation of same-sex marriage and that of
civil partnership. In other words, the supporters of civil partnership—
21 per cent of the population—do not accept the legalisation of samesex marriage, and they might not stand for protection of same-sex
marriage, as indicated by the Apple Daily poll.
Another public opinion poll conducted by Taiwan Public
Opinion Foundation in December 2016 supports the aforementioned
argument. It indicated that 56 per cent of the population opposed any
alteration of the traditional definition of marriage defined by the Civil
Code (1929), and 37.8 per cent of the population supported it.46 In
addition, 44 percent of the population preferred a special law for
same-sex unions, and 43.9 per cent of the population were in
opposition.47 In other words, the majority of Taiwanese still preferred
to distinguish homosexual unions (by special law) from heterosexual
marriages (by traditional civil law). As far as this thesis is concerned,
this still constitutes discrimination; however, only 25.5 per cent of the
population agrees.48
The ongoing controversy in Taiwan about these issues can
also be read by the poll conducted by the United Daily News in
December 2012. It reported that 55 per cent of the population
supported the legalisation of same-sex unions, but 61 per cent of the
population confessed that they would not accept their children being
LGBT.49 According to the poll conducted by the Academia Sinica in
April 2013, 69.1 per cent of the population agreed that Taiwanese
parents would be disappointed with LGBT children,50 and 53.7 per
cent held that it is unacceptable for LGBT lovers to kiss each other
on the street.51 However, 51.6 per cent accepted public kissing by
heterosexuals.52
46 Cheng Hong-Bin, Tai Wan Min Yi Min Diao: 56% Min Zhong Fan Dui Tong Hun
Min Fa Hua (台灣民意民調：56%民眾反對同婚民法化) [Taiwan’s Public Opinion Poll:
56% of the Citizens Are Opposed to the Legalisation of Same-sex Marriage via the Civil
Code], UNITED DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2016), https://video.udn.com/news/617825
[https://perma.cc/3HFD-TRNW].
47 Id.
48 Wang, supra note 42.
49 Public Opinion Poll: Same-sex Marriage: Acceptable; Children as LGBT
Individuals: Unacceptable, supra note 37.
50 Chang Ying-Hwa et al., supra note 38.
51 Id. at 308.
52 Id.
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Table 2: Immediacy of Legalisation of Same-Sex Marriage, 2016
Public Opinion Poll

Support Oppose

N/A

Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (Nov.
2016)53

22.9%

70.7%

6.4%

Nationalist Party (Nov. 2016)54

21.4%

63.6%

15%

(Source: Compiled by the author)

Table 2 displays Taiwan’s public opinion, in November 2016,
about the immediacy of legalisation of same-sex marriage. Polls
conducted by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation and the
Nationalist Party showed that at least two-thirds of the total
population in Taiwan did not consider the legalisation of same-sex
marriage as an urgency.55 However, when the polls are scrutinised
according to nuances in the Chinese language, they should be
interpreted as applying to the immediacy of legalisation for same-sex
unions, in general. In other words, the polls ask whether it is urgent
to protect same-sex unions, and the answer from the Taiwanese
majority is negative, i.e., the lack of legal protection is currently
acceptable.

53
54
55

Cheng, supra note 46.
Wang, supra note 42.
Cheng, supra note 46; Wang, supra note 42.
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Table 3: Analysis of the Legalisation of Same-Sex Marriage by Age,
201356

Consent

<20

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

>60

28

103

122

98

91

36

(75.68%) (77.44%) (71.76%) (50.78%) (45.73%) (22.93%)
Dissent

9

30

48

95

108

121

(24.32%) (22.56%) (28.24%) (49.22%) (54.27%) (77.07%)
Chi-square Test: x²=139.721; p=0.000 < 0.05
(Source: ROC Ministry of Justice)

However, an associative analysis by age shows that the young
generation clearly prefers the legalisation of same-sex unions,57
though it is unclear whether they support the legalisation of same-sex
marriage or that of civil partnership, because the public opinion poll
conducted by the Ministry of Justice in December 2013 made no
distinction between the two forms of legalisation.

4. METHODOLOGY
One of the main arguments within Taiwan about the
legalisation of same-sex marriage58 can be identified as a
metaphysical debate in relation to the problem of universals59, i.e., is
same-sex marriage actually marriage? Such a legal dispute about
56

ROC Ministry of Justice, Taiwan Tongxing Hunyin Fazhihua Zhi Diaocha Yanjiu
(台灣同性婚姻法治化之調查研究) [A Study of Legalisation of Same-sex Marriage in
Taiwan] 64-70 (2003).
57 Id.
58 This is illustrated by comparing SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial
Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017) with its appendix.
59 See generally GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA, RESEMBLANCE NOMINALISM: A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS 31-42 (2002).
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“nominalism”60 somehow reveals a fundamental problem of
Taiwan’s civil law system: the law, which is based upon principles
only, is too abstract, so that Taiwanese jurists must begin with a
debate on the precise definition of marriage in accordance with the
Civil Code (1929).61 However, if we apply common law rules of
interpretation62 to Taiwan, the core of Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.748 [2017] is revealed autonomously without being mired in
philosophical difficulties. Hence, this thesis rests on the application
of common law rules of interpretation developed in England and
Wales63 and accordingly interpreted in Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.748 [2017].
It is somehow absurd for legal professionals to argue whether
same-sex marriage is banned by the present law or not. It is
inconceivable to even think that jurists in common law countries
would argue whether statutory legislation “implies” the consent to
same-sex marriage or not, rather than applying the presumption
against an alteration to common law.64 However, this happens in civil
law countries such as Taiwan. The lack of precise rules of
interpretation can enrich the development of legal theories, but it also
lowers the stability of law and sometimes confuses the core of the
case.
Moreover, this thesis studies Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.748 [2017] through judicial behaviourism, applying both the
attitudinal and the strategic models to interpret the Justices’
adjudication accordingly.

5. THE INTERESTED PARTIES
The interested parties in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748
[2017] were Chi Chia-Wei, the Taipei City Government, the Ministry
of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice. Due to the institutional
design of the constitutional judicial review, the Judicial Yuan not
only hears appeals in civil, criminal, and administrative cases from

60

See generally id.
See text accompanying note 58.
62 See generally ALISDAIR A. GILLESPIE & SIOBHAN WEARE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 38-64 (6th ed., Oxford University Press 2017).
63 See generally id.
64 NEIL DUXBURY, ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATION 36-39 (2013).
61
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the inferior courts,65 i.e., the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, but also
grants compulsory advisory opinions to the government agencies
both ex ante66 and ex post.67 As such, it is sometimes difficult to
identify both the appellant and the respondent in accordance with the
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act (1948/1993):
When a government agency, in carrying out its function and
duty, has doubt about the meanings of a constitutional provision; or,
when a government agency disputes with other agencies in the
application of a constitutional provision; or, when a government
agency has questions on the constitutionality of a statute or regulation
at issue;68
When an individual, a legal entity, or a political party, whose
constitutional right was infringed upon and remedies provided by law
for such infringement had been exhausted, has questions on the
constitutionality of the statute or regulation relied thereupon by the
court of last resort in its final judgment;69
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] consisted of two
related appeals. The first appeal, requested by the Taipei City
Government,70 was categorised as a compulsory advisory opinion. In
this case, the Taipei City Government was the appellant, but there
was no respondent by nature. Hence, both the Ministry of the Interior
and the Ministry of Justice were identified as the agencies concerned.
However, the second appeal was based upon the Supreme
Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014], i.e., Chi
Chia-Wei v. Taipei City Government;71 thus, both the appellant and
the respondent were clear.
65 See SHIZI NO. 371 JIESHI (釋字第371號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 371]
(1995) (establishing the leapfrog appeal to the Judicial Yuan).
66 See e.g., SHIZI NO. 365 JIESHI (釋字第371 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
365] (1994) (requesting a guidance regarding to the amendment of the Civil Code (1929) in
advance).
67 See e.g., SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第342號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
1994] (2017)(requesting a decision in determining the law-making procedure of the congress
after an act in dispute is enacted).
68 Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act of R.O.C. § 5 (1948/1993).
69 Id.
70 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 748] App’x, May 24, 2017 (Taiwan).
71 Please be aware that Chi Chia-Wei v. Taipei City Government is not Taiwan’s official
citation form of the case. The official citation form is: Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan (最高行
政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 103 Trial No.521 [2014].
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5.1. The Appellant and the Respondent
It is notable that the Taipei City Government was both the
appellant and the respondent in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748
(2017). The appeal was filed by Chi Chia-Wei because of its
disallowance of same-sex marriage registration according to law;72
however, the City Government was also the appellant by requesting
a constitutional judicial review with regard to same-sex marriage.73
According to the Taipei City Government, it had received more than
300 requests for same-sex marriage registration in two years’ time,
and they held this human rights event as non-negligible.74 Hence, the
Taipei City Government expected the Judicial Yuan to “give the final
word.”75
There is no doubt that the Taipei City Government stands for
same-sex marriage, though it must reject same-sex marriage
registration under rule of law. The City Mayor, Ko Wen-Je,
enunciated that the appeal of constitutional judicial review indicates
the “gesture”76 of the City Government on same-sex marriage. Such
a political gesture on human rights issues and rule of law is typically
Taipei style; in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.618 [2006], the City
Government also rejected the petition under rule of law, but
encouraged the petitioner, Xie Hong-Mei, to sue the City
Government for discrimination.77
The main argument about same-sex marriage submitted by
the City Government asserted that the freedom of marriage is
72 Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014]; Supreme
Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014]; Shizi No. 748 Jieshi (釋字第
748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017).
73 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
74 Chu Tse-Wei et al., Tonghun Shixian An: Bei Shi Fu: Yin Wujie Chansheng Duili
(同婚釋憲案 北市府：因誤解產生對立) [About the Constitutional Judicial Review in
Relation to Same-sex Marriage, Taipei City Government: The Opposition Roots in the
Misunderstanding], CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 24, 2017),
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/201703240183-1.aspx [perma.cc/HEA5-RJH3].
75 Id.
76 Jiang Yu-Kuei, Tong Hun Shi Xian Mai Da Bu: Ko Wen-Je: Zhe Shi Yi Zhong Tai
Du (同婚釋憲邁大步 柯文哲：這是一種態度) [The Constitutional Judicial Review in
Relation to Same-sex Marriage Is A Big Step Forward: Ko Wen-Je: This Is A Gesture], NOW
NEWS (May 24, 2017),
https://www.nownews.com/news/20170524/2536079 [perma.cc/74TM-H47R].
77 SHIZI NO. 618 JIESHI (釋字第618號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 618]
(2006).
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constitutionally protected78 and “[a]ll the freedoms and rights
enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law
except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the
freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain
social order or to advance public welfare.”79 But the freedom of
marriage is de jure restricted to heterosexual marriage by the Civil
Code (1929): “An agreement to marry shall be made by the male and
the female parties in their own concord.”80 In other words, Article
972 of the Civil Code (1929) deprived LGBT individuals of the
freedom to marry because the freedom to choose a spouse in a samesex marriage is de jure excluded.81
Moreover, the Taipei City Government argued that it is
unconstitutional to ban same-sex marriage in accordance with Article
23 of the Constitution.82 The City Government applied the doctrine
of clausula rebus sic stantibus, asserting expressly that the freedom
of marriage that rests on the social understanding of marriage nearly
90 years ago is disproportional;83 the City Government hinted that the
civil law is out of date.84 Based on the principle of proportionality,85
the City Government doubted the legality of the definition of
marriage provided by Article 972 of the Civil Code (1929), because
the prohibition against same-sex marriage cannot “advance public
welfare” and has nothing to do with “social order.”86 Hence, the
freedom to marry cannot be restricted to heterosexual couples.87
Finally, the Taipei City Government asserted88 that the ban
against same-sex marriage is incompatible with the principle of

78 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 22 (1947) (Taiwan) with Shizi No. 552 Jieshi (釋字
第552號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 552] (2002).
79 See MINGUO XIANFA art. 23 (1947) (Taiwan) (stipulating the principle of
proportionality).
80 Minfa (民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 972 (1929) (Taiwan).
81 Compare Minfa (民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 972 (1929) (Taiwan) with Minfa
(民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 982 (1929/2007) (Taiwan) (applying the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis that the term of agreement to marry implies the term of marriage).
82 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 MINGUO XIANFA art. 23 (1947) (Taiwan).
86 Id.
87 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 748] Appendix: Chi Chia-Wei’s Petition, May 24, 2017 (Taiwan).
88 Id.
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equality embodied in the Constitution.89 Article 972 of the Civil
Code (1929) has deprived LGBT people in Taiwan of the freedom to
marry and directly constitutes discrimination against them.90
5.2. The Appellant Chi Chia-Wei
Chi Chia-Wei was the first person in Taiwan to have publicly
identified himself as LGBT,91 and he has fought for same-sex
marriage in Taiwan for 30 years.92 His registration of same-sex
marriage was rejected by the Wanhua Household Registration Office
of Taipei on 22 March 2013,93 and the petition for reconsideration
was dismissed on 29 May.94 He subsequently appealed to the Taipei
High Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court;
however, both appeals were dismissed.95
In Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit
No.931 [2014], Judge Hu Fang-Xin held that same-sex marriage is
literally excluded by the Civil Code (1929) because the Code
provides the meaning of the words within the statute. In other words,
the High Administrative Court had no power to modify the meaning
of marriage decided by the legislature. Moreover, the Court held that
Article 23II of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966) does not imply or hold any basis for the legitimisation
of same-sex marriage. Hence, the Court dismissed the appeal.96
In Supreme Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial
No.521 [2014], Judge Huang He-Wen affirmed the decision in Taipei
High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014]. He
further indicated that the Court interpreted the Civil Code (1929) in
accordance with the purposive rule97 and found same-sex marriage
89

MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan).
SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
91 Id.
92 AFP, Chi Chia-Wei Eyes End to 30-Year Gay Marriage Fight, TAIPEI TIMES (May
14, 2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/print/2017/05/14/2003670568
[perma.cc/P2NA-TKBY].
93 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
94 Id.
95 Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014]; Supreme
Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014].
96 Taipei High Administrative Court Adjudication, 102 Suit No.931 [2014].
97 See generally R v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle [2003] UKHL
13, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jd030313/quinta-1.htm
90
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incompatible. It seems that the Court read marriage as common law,
so that same-sex marriage cannot be deemed lawful because of the
presumption against an alteration to common law:98 “[S]tatutes are to
be interpreted in the light of the common law. . . . [S]tatutes are not
presumed to make any alteration in the common law further, or
otherwise, than the act does expressly declare.”99 Hence, the Court
also dismissed the appeal.100
Chi Chia-Wei appealed the Supreme Administrative Court
Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014] on 20 August 2015. His main
argument101 rested on the principle of equality embodied in the
Constitution.102 He asserted that Article 7 of the Constitution (1947)
presumes against discrimination unless and until it is proved
necessary;103 hence, he requested that the legal definition of marriage
be subject to strict scrutiny104 for the sake of equal protection.105
Moreover, he linked the legalisation of same-sex marriage with the
international standard of human rights, persuading the Justices to
override the definition of marriage provided by the Civil Code
(1929).106
However, there were many paradoxical assertions within Chi
Chia-Wei’s instrument of appeal. He argued that there is no written
restriction against same-sex marriage provided by the Civil Code
(1929) when he blamed the courts for misinterpretation; yet he later
altered his argument and claimed that the prohibition of same-sex
marriage stipulated by the Civil Code (1929) constitutes
discrimination against homosexual orientation.107 Moreover, he
[https://perma.cc/NG94-DALT].
98 DUXBURY, supra note 64.
99 GUSTAV ADOLF ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES
173 (Lawbook Exchange 2006) (1888).
100 Supreme Administrative Court Adjudication, 103 Trial No.521 [2014].
101 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
102 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan) with MINGUO XIANFA art. 23
(1947) (Taiwan).
103 NIGEL N.T. LI (李念祖), ANLI XIANFA III: RENQUAN BAOZHANG DE NEIRONG (案
例憲法III（下）─人權保障的內容) [CONSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDIES III: THE MERIT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION], BOOK 2 476-478 (2006).
104 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
105 CHUCK STEWART, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 185 (2001).
106 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
107 Id.
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persuaded the Justices to legalise same-sex marriage in Taiwan in
order to meet the international human rights standard by telling the
Justices that only one-tenth of the countries in the world had legalised
same-sex marriage.108 It was even more problematic that after he
devoted space and energy to arguments based on international law,
he later argued that the Constitution is supreme and international law
is inferior.109
5.3. The Agencies Concerned
On a strict view, there is no attorney general in Taiwan
because the Prosecutor General of the Republic of China does not
“fill the role of legal advisor”110 to the government. However, the
Ministry of the Interior, as the prime agency concerned in Judicial
Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017], requested an advisory opinion
provided by the Ministry of Justice and directly “[deferred] to the
MOJ’s opinions on the constitutionality of the Marriage Chapter.”111
Hence, the advisory opinion112 served as the main argument of the
agencies concerned, and the Ministry of Justice was thus directly
involved.
The first argument of the Ministry of Justice was based upon
the presumption against an alteration to common law.113 It asserted
that the definition of marriage embodied in the Civil Code (1929) has
been established by custom and ethics for thousands of years, and the
Code simply respects that tradition.114 Hence, the definition of
marriage in the Code definitely excludes same-sex marriage.115 In
addition, the Ministry of Justice argued that the definition of marriage
established by custom and ethics demands respect and constitutes a

108

Id.
Id.
110 GABRIELLE APPLEBY, THE ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL: NEGOTIATING LAW,
POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 35 (2016); STEVE WILSON ET AL., ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 52 (2014).
111 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
112 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
113 See generally DUXBURY, supra note 64.
114 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
115 Id.
109
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common law right,116 and the Civil Code (1929) does not serve to
alter any common law right unless it clearly says so.117
The second argument of the Ministry of Justice indicated that
the freedom to marry is not a constitutional right until the Justices say
it is, because nothing in the Constitution addresses the issue.118
Moreover, in accordance with precedent, the Justices have never
granted the freedom to enter into same-sex marriage.119 Therefore,
the Ministry of Justice cast strong doubt on the legality of same-sex
marriage in Taiwan.120
The third argument of the Ministry of Justice rested on the
“mischief rule.”121 According to the Constitution, “All citizens of the
Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party
affiliation, shall be equal before the law.”122 However, the Ministry
of Justice argued that it is irrational to allege that the Constitution
permits same-sex marriage because the aforementioned
constitutional Article only intends to protect gender equality between
men and women;123 the term “sex” adopted in the Constitution is
“men (Nan) and women (Nu).” Hence, the Ministry of Justice
asserted that there are no equality rights of same-sex marriage found
in the Constitution.124 The presumption of constitutional protection
for same-sex marriage implies the presumption of Chinese
acceptance of LGBT individuals in the 1940s, which is not true.
Finally, the Ministry of Justice asserted that same-sex
marriage is not yet a universal value in Taiwan; thus, it is premature
to acknowledge same-sex marriage as a constitutional right.125
Moreover, international law imposes no obligation on countries to
legalise same-sex marriage, so it is disproportional to legalise samesex marriage at this point.126 In other words, the Ministry of Justice

116

Minfa (民法) [Civil Code of the R.O.C.] § 1 (1929) (Taiwan).
SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
App’x (2017).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See generally Heydon’s Case [1584] 3 Co Rep 79.
122 MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan).
123 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 748] App’x, May 24, 2017 (Taiwan).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
117
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disagreed with granting a constitutional right that is not yet deemed a
universal value in Taiwan.127

6. JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO.748 [2017]
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748 [2017] was appealed by
Chi Chia-Wei on 20 August 2015128 and by the Taipei City
Government on 4 November 2015.129 The two appeals were
consolidated by the Justices, and conditional leave was granted on 10
February 2017.130 The case was heard by 14 of the 15 Justices131 on
24 March 2017,132 and the decision was promulgated on 24 May.133
The Justices held unconstitutional the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code (1929) in relation to marriage and said:
The provisions of [ . . . ] the Civil Code do not allow two
persons of the same sex to create a permanent union of intimate and
exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life. The said
provisions, to the extent of such failure, are in violation of
constitution’s guarantees of both the people’s freedom of marriage
under Article 22 and the people’s right to equality under Article 7.134
The reasoning of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]
began with Chi Chia-Wei’s long march towards the legalisation of
same-sex marriage.135 The Justices affirmed that “[f]or more than
three decades, Chia-Wei Chi has been appealing to the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments for the right to same-sex
marriage.”136 However, “after more than a decade, the [Legislative
Yuan] is still unable to pass the legislation regarding same-sex
marriage”137 and “it is still uncertain when these bills will be
127

Id.
Id.
129 Id.
130 Judicial Yuan Proclamation (司法院新聞稿) No.106-015 (10 February 2017).
131 See SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Justice Huang Jui-Ming applying disqualification due to his wife’s political
preference that she is the congresswoman who promotes the bill of same-sex marriage in
Taiwan).
132 Judicial Yuan Proclamation (司法院新聞稿) No.106-015 (10 February 2017).
133 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
134 Id.
135 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 8 (2017).
136 Id.
137 Id. at ¶ 9.
128
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reviewed on the floor of the [Legislative Yuan].”138 Hence, the Court
justified its political intervention and issued a court order for samesex marriage:
The authorities concerned shall amend or enact the laws as
appropriate, in accordance with the ruling of this Interpretation,
within two years from the announcement of this Interpretation. It is
within the discretion of the authorities concerned to determine the
formality for achieving the equal protection of the freedom of
marriage. If the authorities concerned fail to amend or enact the laws
as appropriate within the said two years, two persons of the same sex
who intend to create the said permanent union shall be allowed to
have their marriage registration effectuated at the authorities in
charge of household registration, by submitting a written document
signed by two or more witnesses in accordance with the said Marriage
Chapter.139
It is obvious that the Justices prefer the legalisation of samesex unions, but we do not know the type of legalisation that they
prefer—same-sex marriage or civil partnership. However, it can be
reasonably asserted that the Justices deliberately made a strategic
decision140 that leaves “the formality for achieving the equal
protection of the freedom of marriage”141 to “the authorities
concerned,”142 i.e., the Legislative Yuan. The evidence is actually
provided by the Justices themselves. If the Justices are capable of
issuing a court order that authorises LGBT individuals to “have their
marriage registration effectuated at the authorities in charge of
household registration, by submitting a written document signed by
two or more witnesses”143 when “the authorities concerned fail to
amend or enact the laws as appropriate within the said two years,”144
then the Justices are constitutionally powerful enough to unilaterally
decide the proper form of the legalisation of same-sex unions. In
other words, they did not want to make a firm decision on the form

138
139

Id.
SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]

(2017)
140
141

See generally EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 15.
SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]

(2017).
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
Id.
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that legalisation would take and thus strategically ordered “the
authorities concerned”145 to do so.
Moreover, the Justices not only described Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No.748 [2017] as a case with “the very controversial
social and political issues of whether homosexuals shall have the
autonomy to choose whom to marry, and of whether they shall enjoy
the equal protection of the same freedom of marriage as
heterosexuals,”146 but they also indicated the legal ground for judicial
intervention: concerning human rights, the Judicial Yuan has the
jurisdiction to scrutinise even legislative omissions:147
[T]he timetable for such legislative solution is hardly
predictable now and yet these petitions concern the protection of
people’s fundamental rights. It is the constitutional duty of this Court
to render a binding judicial decision, in time, on issues concerning
the safeguarding of constitutional basic values. [ . . . ] For these
reasons, this Court [ . . . ] has made its best efforts in granting review
of these petitions and, after holding oral hearing on the designated
date, has made this Interpretation to address the above constitutional
issues.148
It appears that the Justices attempted to communicate with
their audiences149 through their ruling, and we may also identify
whom they aimed to communicate with.150 When the Justices defend
judicial intervention in a case that involves political controversy, their
audience is not the general public151 (because it is unnecessary to
explain “the principle of mutual respect among governmental

145

Id.
SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 10 (2017).
147 See generally WU GENG (吳庚), XIAN FA DE JIE SHI YU SHI YONG (憲法的解釋與適
用) [THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 408-419 (2004)
(applying the German legal principle of intensivierte inhaltliche Kontrolle and the
Schumannsche Formel).
148 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 10 (2017).
149 See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 25-49 (2006).
151 Id. at 46-47.
152 Id. at 60-72.
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powers”152), but the Legislative Yuan.153 Furthermore, it is also
unnecessary to discuss the counter-majoritarian difficulty154 unless
the audience is the law society.155 Hence, the Justices in Judicial
Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] considered the Legislative Yuan
and the law society as their crucial audiences, and we posit that the
reason is based upon statistics: Taiwanese public opinion in regard to
the legalisation of same-sex marriage is divided, so the Justices could
not obtain public support under such a circumstance.156
The Justices’ statement in Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.748 [2017] not only reflects their political concern but also
exposes their preference for same-sex unions; when public opinion is
divided, the Judicial Yuan’s precedents suggest either the application
of the political question doctrine157 or procedural dismissal158
(Beschluss). Nevertheless, in this ruling the Justices did not follow
these patterns, and it is likely that legalisation of same-sex unions was
their policy preference.159
Those prior [Judicial Yuan] Interpretations mentioning
“husband and wife” or “a man and a woman” were made within the
context of opposite-sex marriage, in terms of the factual backgrounds
of the original cases from which they arose. [ . . . ] Thus far, this

153

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 10 (2017).
154 Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574(1) ANN.
AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 145, 145-157 (2001) (indicating the influence of a legislature to a
supreme court so that the court shall consider the legislature as its audience).
154 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu, Chen-Huan, dissenting); see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 9-22 (1986); see also Or Bassok,
The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 333 (2012)
(showing “the deep influence of public opinion polls on American constitutional thought by
analysing two versions of the countermajoritarian difficulty).
155 BAUM, supra note 149.
156 See Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional
Decision Making, 13(2) UNIV. PA. J. CONST. LAW 283, 283-284 (2010) (asserting that the
courts can disregard the criticism based upon the countermajoritarian difficulty “if public
opinion [ . . . ] comes [sic] in line with the judicial view”).
157 E.g., S SHIZI NO. 328 JIESHI (釋字第328號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
328] (1993).
158 E.g., Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution No.1166 [2001] (Chi Chia-Wei’s first
appeal to the Judicial Yuan against the prohibition of same-sex marriage).
159 See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14 (arguing that the decision-making
processes of the U.S. Supreme Court are based on the justices’ attitudes and values instead
of “plain meaning, intent of the framers (or legislators), precedent, and balancing”).
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Court has not made any Interpretation on the issue of whether two
persons of the same sex are allowed to marry each other.160
The first announcement of the Justices in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No.748 [2017] was that the decision in this case was
given per incuriam, and it is over-interpretative to assert that the
Court’s precedents constituted any protection against the prohibition
of same-sex marriage.161 Moreover, the Justices affirmed that the
Civil Code (1929) provides no space for same-sex marriage in
accordance with the noscitur a sociis doctrine that the term of
agreement to marry implies the term of marriage.162 In other words,
the Justices upheld that same-sex marriage is legally banned in
Taiwan, which establishes this controversy as a constitutional issue,
and the interpretatio authentica of such a circumstance is reserved
exclusively for the Judicial Yuan.163 Hence, the Justices affirmed
that:
Unspoused persons eligible to marry shall have their freedom
of marriage, which includes the freedom to decide “whether to
marry” and “whom to marry.” [ . . . ] Such decisional autonomy is
vital to the sound development of personality and safeguarding of
human dignity, and therefore is a fundamental right to be protected
by Article 22 of the Constitution. [ . . . ] Furthermore, the freedom of
marriage for two persons of the same sex, once legally recognized,
will constitute the bedrock of a stable society, together with oppositesex marriage. The need, capability, willingness and longing, in both
physical and psychological senses, for creating such permanent
unions of intimate and exclusive nature are equally essential to
homosexuals and heterosexuals, given the importance of the freedom
of marriage to the sound development of personality and
safeguarding of human dignity. Both types of union shall be protected
by the freedom of marriage under Article 22 of the Constitution.164
The main reason the Justices preferred same-sex unions rests
on “the sound development of personality and safeguarding of human

160

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 11 (2017).
161 Id.
162 Id. at ¶ 12.
163 Compare MINGUO XIANFA art. 171 (1947) (Taiwan) with MINGUO XIANFA art. 173
(1947) (Taiwan).
164 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 13 (2017).
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dignity,”165 by which they disagreed with the legal classification of
“permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature”166 between
heterosexuality and homosexuality. Such an opinion should not be
overinterpreted; it does not mean that the Justices found no difference
between the two; however, it surely means that the Justices did not
consider the “permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature”167
as an exclusive right for heterosexual couples.168 We hold that this
was the Justices’ sincere and attitudinal169 decision. The Justices held
that:
The current Marriage Chapter only provides for the
permanent union between a man and a woman, without providing that
two persons of the same sex may also create an identical permanent
union. This constitutes a classification on the basis of sexual
orientation, which gives homosexuals relatively unfavorable
treatment in their freedom of marriage.170
The “ideological attitudes and values of the [J]ustices”171 can
be read by the Justices’ interpretations of Articles 7 and 22 of the
Constitution of 1947. The two Articles state nothing with respect to
the right to same-sex marriage; Article 7 provides that “[a]ll citizens
of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or
party affiliation, shall be equal before the law;”172 and Article 22
stipulates that “[a]ll other freedoms and rights of the people that are
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed
under the Constitution.”173 However, the Justices interpreted that
“[t]he five classifications of impermissible discrimination set forth in
[Article 7] are only illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Therefore,
different treatment based on other classifications, such as disability
165

Id.
Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at ¶ 15.
169 See generally LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 109-132 (2006) (explaining the attitudinal model which proposes that “judges’
decisions are based on the facts of the case but only ‘in light of the ideological attitudes and
values of the justices’”); see also SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14 (asserting that “the
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the justices”).
170 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 15 (2017).
171 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14, at 86.
172 MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan).
173 Id. art. 22.
166
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or sexual orientation, shall also be governed by the right to equality
under the said Article.”174 Moreover, the linkage between Article 22
and same-sex marriage is that “[g]iven its close relation to the
freedom of personality and human dignity, the freedom of marriage
promised by Article 22 of the Constitution is a fundamental right;”175
thus “the provisions of the Marriage Chapter are incompatible with
the spirit and meaning of the freedom of marriage as protected by
Article 22 of the Constitution.”176 In other words, the right of samesex marriage in Taiwan is a constitutional right created by (or, at least,
interpreted by) the Justices177 because the Constitution stipulates
nothing at all.
Based upon this judge-made constitutional right to same-sex
marriage, the Justices affirmed that prohibition of same-sex unions is
unconstitutional178 for the following three reasons:
1.
The Justices asserted that “sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic that is resistant to change.”179 Hence, it is
incorrect to deem homosexuality a disease.180 On a contrary, it is
appropriate to classify LGBT individuals into a sort of “ethic and
social” minority that requires affirmative action measures181 in order
to fulfil the genuine equality provided by the Constitution.182
2.
The Court disagreed with the assertion that
procreation is integral to an essential definition of marriage because
there is no such legal obligation for heterosexual couples.183 Hence,
it is surely irrational184 to burden homosexual couples with
174

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 14 (2017).
175 Id. at ¶ 15.
176 Id. at ¶ 13.
177 See SHIZI NO. 185 JIESHI (釋字第185號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 185]
(1984) (holding that the Justices’ decision “shall be binding upon every institution and
person in the country, and each institution shall abide by the meaning of these interpretations
in handling relevant matters,” i.e., judge-made constitutional law).
178 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
179 Id. at ¶ 15.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at ¶ 16.
184 See generally CCSU v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] 1 A.C. 374 (Lord Diplock
holding that the doctrine of irrationality “applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his
mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it”).
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procreation. Vice versa, it is inequitable to prohibit same-sex unions
because of the impossibility of procreation.185
3.
The Justices could not find a linkage between the
degeneracy of moral order and the legalisation of same-sex
marriage186 because, as far as this thesis is concerned, the Justices
replaced “the concept of moral order” by “that of moral order within
heterosexual marriage,”187 i.e., disguised displacement. The Justices
did not answer the question of whether or not legalisation of samesex marriage may lay bare the moral bankruptcy of the entire society,
yet they asserted that “the basic ethical orders built upon the existing
institution of opposite-sex marriage will remain unaffected, even if
two persons of the same sex are allowed to enter into a legallyrecognized marriage.”188 Hence, it is disproportional to prohibit
same-sex unions.189
In a nutshell, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]
comprised both sincere and strategic decisions. It is likely that the
Justices sympathised with LGBT individuals and thus sincerely
preferred the legalisation of same-sex marriage. The Justices may be
criticised in light of the countermajoritarian difficulty190 when public
opinion in Taiwan is divided, but they did not apply the political
question doctrine.191 Moreover, the Justices even attempted to pacify
opponents of same-sex marriage with the following words:
This Interpretation leaves unchanged the party status as well
as the related rights and obligations for the institution of opposite-sex
marriage under the current Marriage Chapter. This Interpretation
only addresses the issues of whether the provisions of the Marriage
Chapter, which do not allow two persons of the same sex to create a
permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of
living a common life together, violate the freedom of marriage

185

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 16 (2017).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting); see also BICKEL, supra note 154; Bassok, supra note
154.
191 E.g., SHIZI NO. 328 JIESHI (釋字第328號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
328] (1993).
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protected by Article 22 and the right to equality guaranteed by Article
7 of the Constitution.192
However, we also note that the Justices avoided deciding the
legal form of legalisation for same-sex unions—either “marriage” or
“civil partnership.”193 As indicated earlier, public opinion in
Taiwan194 in regard to the legal form of same-sex unions is divided,195
so the Justices could not obtain public support under such a
circumstance.196 Hence, we observe how the Justices avoided being
criticised in light of the separation of powers argument197 and the
countermajoritarian difficulty;198 they justified their judicial
behaviour voluntarily, by which we posit that they made the decision
in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] under political
pressure.

7. JUDICIAL OPINIONS
There were two additional judicial opinions submitted in
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]: the partial dissenting
opinion of Justice Huang Horng-Shya199 and the dissenting opinion
of Justice Wu Chen-Huan.200 Both opinions implied a preference for
the application of the political question doctrine,201 because both
argued that the definition of marriage must be decided by democratic

192

SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 18 (2017).
193 Id. at ¶ 17.
194 Cheng, supra note 46; Wang, supra note 42.
195 ROC Ministry of Justice, supra note 32.
196 See Dorf, supra 156 (asserting that the courts can disregard the criticism based upon
the countermajoritarian difficulty “if public opinion [ . . . ] comes [sic] in line with the
judicial view”).
197 See SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶ 10 (2017) (affirming that the court complies with “the principle of mutual
respect among governmental powers” unless in the event of legislative omission).
198 See Id. (asserting that the court must fulfill its constitutional duty to “render a binding
judicial decision, in time, on issues concerning the safeguarding of constitutional basic
values”).
199 Id. Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting.
200 Id. Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting.
201 E.g., SHIZI NO. 328 JIESHI (釋字第328號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
328] (1993); SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI (釋字第419號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
419] (1996).
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means.202 However, Justice Huang Horng-Shya voted for the
legalisation of same-sex unions, albeit without indicating the precise
form;203 and Justice Wu Chen-Huan clearly opposed the legalisation
of same-sex marriage without mentioning his opinion about the
legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships.204
7.1. Partial Dissenting Opinion of Justice Huang Horng-Shya
As far as this thesis is concerned, the partial dissenting
opinion of Justice Huang Horng-Shya205 was not so much a judicial
opinion as sentimental propaganda. It began with a theatrical and
sensational proclamation that “we are all brothers and sisters who live
together in Taiwan, and all of you are my preciouses . . . .”206 Some
might say that (female) Justice Huang Horng-Shya was simply
expressing a maternal view; however, this does not constitute a
judicial opinion under normal expectations.207 Moreover, this partial
dissenting opinion208 seems to be a political statement as to how
difficult it was to render a judicial decision under public pressure,
which implies the Justices’ awareness of the division of public
opinion, i.e., Justice Huang Horng-Shya’s obiter dictum, “all of you
are my preciouses.”209 Nevertheless, the unusual dissonance between
the expected formality of a judicial opinion and Justice Huang HorngShya’s partial dissenting opinion does not depreciate the value of her
points.

202 Compare SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No. 748] (2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting) with SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第
748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
203 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting).
204 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
205 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting).
206 Id. (Author’s translation).
207 Please do not consider this description as sexual discrimination against female
judges; I completely have no intention to do so. However, Justice Huang Horng-Shya speaks
in a sensational tone of voice in her dissenting opinion, which is very rare in the legal
archives. Its tone is that of a letter written by a mother, which is unfortunately a common
approach that Taiwanese politicians have consistently applied in politics.
208 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting).
209 Id.
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Justice Huang Horng-Shya clearly announced that she voted
to legalise same-sex unions, albeit with ambiguity about the form of
legalisation.210 She argued philosophically that change is an
everlasting principle of the universe, thus change is normal and
constancy is abnormal.211 Based on this idea, she argued, apparently
with the mass public as her intended audience, that everything
changes as time goes on, including the concept of marriage, so that
we should accept and bless same-sex unions.212
However, Justice Huang Horng-Shya disagreed with the
majority opinion in regard to the freedom of marriage.213 She noted
that it is entirely illogical to apply the freedom of marriage to samesex marriage if the Judicial Yuan fails to redefine “marriage” in
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017]214, i.e., there would be no
freedom of same-sex marriage if the definition of marriage remained
unchanged. Furthermore, she doubted whether the Justices had the
authority to redefine “marriage,”215 and it appears that Justice Huang
Horng-Shya preferred the application of the political question
doctrine216 to the concrete judicial decision.
Justice Huang Horng-Shya also asserted that it is untrue to
claim that there is no difference between heterosexual and
homosexual unions.217 Hence, it is inequitable to demand that the law
in relation to heterosexual marriage should be the same as the law in
relation to homosexual unions.218 One of the examples provided by
Justice Huang Horng-Shya was that she did not directly consider the
distinction between male and female as sexual discrimination unless
the distinction was unreasonable.219 In other words, she held that the
distinction between same-sex unions and heterosexual marriage does
not directly constitute an infringement against equality.220
210

Id.
Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 E.g., SHIZI NO. 328 JIESHI (釋字第328號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
328] (1993); SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI (釋字第419號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
419] (1996).
217 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
211
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7.2. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Wu Chen-Huan
The dissenting opinion submitted by Justice Wu Chen-Huan
shows that he strongly opposed the legalisation of same-sex
marriage,221 though we do not know whether he also opposed the
legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships.222 Justice Wu Chen-Huan
obtained his doctorate (S.J.D.) at Bond University, Australia, and he
served as a chief prosecutor before being appointed as a Justice.
Hence, it is not surprising that in accordance with his career
background he preferred the legal opinion submitted by the Ministry
of Justice.223
Justice Wu Chen-Huan held that the freedom of marriage
protected by the Constitution of 1947 is limited to heterosexual
unions, and any change in the definition of marriage should be
decided democratically.224 He argued, in accordance with Schalk and
Kopf v. Austria [2010] ECHR 1996 and Vallanatos and Others v.
Greece [2013] ECHR 1110, that marriage is an “institution”225 with
“deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ
largely from one society to another.”226 Hence, it is irrational to
legalise same-sex marriage in accordance with a global trend.227
Moreover, Justice Wu Chen-Huan asserted that the Constitution does
not recognise same-sex marriage, and all of the Judicial Yuan’s
precedents were decided on the basis of heterosexual marriage.228
As an expert in international law, Justice Wu Chen-Huan
provided substantial citation from that field to support his argument
that the legalisation of same-sex marriage is not yet an international
221 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
222 See Id. (arguing in accordance with Vallanatos and Others v. Greece [2013] ECHR
1110 and Oliari and Others v. Italy [2015] ECHR 716 that the legalisation of same-sex civil
partnership is obligated only when a country establishes the civil partnership system, e.g.,
Vallanatos and Others v. Greece; or when the right of same-sex unions is acknowledged by
the constitution, e.g., Oliari and Others v. Italy).
223 Cf. BAUM, supra note 149 (suggesting that the prosecutors within the Ministry of
Justice may be the main judicial audience of Justice Wu Chen-Huan in SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI
(釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017).
224 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
225 Id.
226 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010) ECHR 1996.
227 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
228 Id.
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standard of fundamental rights.229 He also provided a list of the
countries that have legalised same-sex marriage and doubted whether
it is reasonable to consider legalisation as an international standard230,
i.e., there are only 21 out of 193 countries that have legalised samesex marriage, which cannot constitute a standard.231

8. CONCLUSION
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.748 [2017] opened the gate
for the legalisation of same-sex unions in Taiwan; however, it did not
determine the precise form of legalisation,232 and we still do not know
whether Taiwan will legalise same-sex “marriage” or same-sex “civil
partnership” before the given judicial deadline for a legislative
change, i.e., 23 May 2019.233 The Judicial Yuan’s court order only
extends to the legalisation of same-sex unions (sincere decision) but
leaves the political hot potato to the Legislative Yuan (strategic
decision).234 If the official form of legalisation of same-sex unions
angers the public, the Legislative Yuan will bear the criticism, rather
than the Judicial Yuan.
We believe that the theories presented in Section 2
(Theoretical Insights) mirror how the Justices read the same-sex
marriage case, though they did not express their real views. In
reading the reasoning presented in Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No.748 [2017], we can discover that the Justices were not interested
in the definition of marriage, nor the debate as to whether the Civil
Code (1929) effectively prohibited same-sex marriage or not.235 The
Justices’ attention was always very clear: this is nothing less than an
issue of human equality.236 Hence, the Justices responded to the
principle of equality237 and linked up the freedom of marriage238 with

229

Id.
Id.
231 Id.
232 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning¶ 17 (2017).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
236 Id.
237 MINGUO XIANFA art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan).
238 Id. art. 22.
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this principle,239 thus holding unconstitutional the prohibition of
same-sex marriage because it constitutes clear discrimination against
LGBT individuals.240
However, the partial dissenting opinion of Justice Huang
Horng-Shya241 and the dissenting opinion of Justice Wu ChenHuan242 both suggested applying the political question doctrine
because of the countermajoritarian difficulty.243 This implies that
both Justices disagreed with the legalisation of same-sex marriage
outside the context of legislative action.244 If the majority in Taiwan
really preferred the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the Legislative
Yuan would naturally take over the problem and there would be no
need for the Judicial Yuan to make any concrete decision at all.

239 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
Reasoning ¶¶ 15-16 (2017).
240 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017).
241 Id. Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting.
242 Id. Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting.
243 BICKEL, supra note 154; Bassok, supra note 154.
244 SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748]
(2017) (Huang Horng-Shya, partial dissenting); SHIZI NO. 748 JIESHI (釋字第748 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (2017) (Wu Chen-Huan, dissenting).
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